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Robinson: Constitutional Law: Supressing the Exclusionary Rule

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUPPRESSING THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006)
Benjamin J. Robinson*
Police obtained a warrant to search Petitioner's home and, after
announcing their presence, waited only a short time before they entered
and discovered drugs and a loaded gun.' The State charged Petitioner with
unlawful drug and firearm possession.2 Petitioner moved to suppress all
evidence from the search by arguing that police entered his home too soon
after their announcement, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment.3 The
trial court granted Petitioner's motion, but the Michigan Court of Appeals
reversed on interlocutory review.4 The Michigan Supreme Court denied
Petitioner's application for leave to appeal,' and Petitioner was convicted
of drug possession.6 Petitioner challenged his conviction and reasserted his
argument that police violated the Fourth Amendment.7 The Michigan
Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction, and the Michigan
Supreme Court again declined review.8 The United States Supreme Court
* A.B. Wabash College, J.D. expected 2008, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
For my wife.
1. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006).
2. Id. Police delayed their entry approximately three to five seconds after announcing their
presence. Id.
3. Id. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See generally Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Case Comment, ConstitutionalLaw:
Ratifying Suspicionless Canine Sniffs: Dog Days on the Highways, 57 FLA. L. REv. 963, 964-65
(2005) (discussing the Supreme Court's evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
4. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162. The Michigan Court of Appeals held suppression
inappropriate when police search under a warrant but fail to properly knock and announce their
presence. Id.
5. People v. Hudson, 639 N.W.2d 255,255 (Mich. 2001), aff'd, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
6. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006). Petitioner was convicted of
possession of less than twenty-five grams of cocaine and sentenced to eighteen months of
probation. People v. Hudson, No. 246403, 2004 WL 1366947, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. June 17,
2004).
7. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162.
8. Id.
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granted certiorari 9 and, in affirming the decision, HELD that a violation of
the knock-and-announce rule' ° does not require a court to suppress all
evidence found during the search." In reaching its conclusion, the Court
determined that the substantial social costs imposed by the exclusionary
rule exceed its deterrent benefits and that alternative remedies provide
adequate protection against Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce
violations. 2
9. Hudson v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 1138 (2005).
10. Michigan's knock-and-announce provision is codified in MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 780.656 (West 2007). The federal knock-and-announce statute is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3109
(2000). The federal statute provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any
part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of
his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate
himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
Id.; see also Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) (holding that the common-law knockand-announce principle "forms apart of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment").
11. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165, 2168. Respondent conceded the knock-and-announce
violation. Id. at 2163. Therefore, the instant Court limited its inquiry to the proper remedy for
violations of the knock-and-announce requirement. Id. The Court specifically declined a remedial
inquiry in previous knock-and-announce cases. See, e.g., Wilson, 514 U.S. at 937 n.4 (declining to
address whether exclusion is a constitutionally compelled remedy for violations of the knock-andannounce requirement). But the knock-and-announce requirement is not absolute. Between Wilson
and the instant case, the Court examined the knock-and-announce requirement on three separate
occasions. See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 33 (2003) (recognizing a fifteen to twenty
second delay by police as reasonable following knock-and-announce); United States v. Ramirez,
523 U.S. 65, 70-71 (1998) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not subject police to a higher
standard in knock-and-announce cases than that applicable to "no-knock" entries during which
police damage property); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 388 (1997) (rejecting a blanket
exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations).
12. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166-68. For example, the Court observed that a damages claim
under 42 U.S.C § 1983 provides an adequate remedy for Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce
violations. Id. at 2167-68. Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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The exclusionary rule is ajudicially created remedy designed to operate
as a powerful check against police misconduct. 3 In Mapp v. Ohio,"4 the
Court considered whether evidence obtained through a search that violated
the Fourth Amendment could be admitted in a state criminal proceeding.' 5
The petitioner denied entry to state police officers who attempted to search
her home without producing a warrant.' 6 Police forced their way inside
and, after an extensive search, arrested the petitioner for possession of
obscene material. 7 The petitioner was convicted, and the Supreme Court
of Ohio upheld her conviction." On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the decision and held that all evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not admissible in a
state court. 19
Mapp expanded the exclusionary rule's scope by applying the rule to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.2" The majority emphasized
that the exclusionary rule secures the privilege and enjoyment of the
Fourth Amendment through deterrence of police misconduct.2" In fact, the
Court emphasized deterrence as the exclusionary rule's undergirding

13. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court first held that in a federal
prosecution the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal search
and seizure. Id. at 398. The Court first adopted the rule to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right
of all citizens .'to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures ... ' United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend IV); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
14. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15. Id. at 656-57. The Court had previously rejected application of the exclusionary rule in
state criminal proceedings. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (concluding that "in a
prosecution in a state court for a state crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the
admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure").
16. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644. Police responded to information that a person who was wanted
for questioning in connection with a recent bombing was hiding in the home and "that there was
a large amount of policy paraphernalia being hidden in the home." Id. At trial, the prosecution did
not enter a search warrant into evidence, nor did it explain the failure to produce a warrant. Id. at
645.
17. Id. at 644-45.
18. Id. at 655-56. The Supreme Court of Ohio acknowledged that the respondent's conviction
was "based primarily upon the introduction [of] evidence ... seized during [the] unlawful search."
Id.
19. Id. at 655. The Court reasoned that because "the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy
has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
[Amendment], it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against
the Federal Government." Id.
20. Id. at 655-56. The Court further opined: "[O]ur holding that the exclusionary rule is an
essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is not only the logical dictate of prior
cases, but it also makes very good sense." Id. at 657.
21. Id. at 648.
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principle.22 The majority reasoned that such deterrence compels respect for
Fourth Amendment rights in 'the only effectively available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard [them]. "'23 The Court analyzed several
alternative remedies, but concluded that such alternatives were either
inadequate or illusory.24
In United States v. Leon,25 the Court reviewed the scope of the
exclusionary rule in light of Mapp, and considered whether to recognize
a good-faith exception to the rule.26 Police obtained a warrant to search the
respondent's home and discovered a large quantity of drugs.27 The
respondent was indicted for violating federal drug laws, but a district court
found that the search warrant's supporting affidavit was insufficient and
therefore granted the respondent's motion to suppress the evidence seized
under the warrant.28 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed,2 9
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.3" Carving out a
significant good-faith exception, the Court held that "evidence obtained in
objectively reasonable reliance" upon a facially valid search warrant later
shown to violate the Fourth Amendment is admissible in federal and state
criminal prosecutions.3 '
In Leon, the Court first considered the broad application of the Mapp
holding32 and reasoned that the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect would
not be achieved by suppressing the illegally obtained evidence.33 The
majority established a cost-benefit analysis for applying the exclusionary
rule, limiting the rule's application to instances where its costs,
specifically the exclusion of reliable information from the "'truth-finding
function[] of the courts,"' do not outweigh its deterrent benefits.34 The
Court observed that the exclusionary rule was designed to deter police
misconduct,35 but that the police had acted objectively and reasonably in

22. Id.
23. Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
24. Id. at 670 (dismissing police disciplinary action, prosecution, and private trespass actions
as either too lofty or too onerous).
25. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
26. Id. at 900, 905.
27. Id. at 902.
28. Id. at 903.
29. United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983).
30. Leon, 468 U.S. at 904-05.
31. Id. at 922-23.
32. See id. at 905-06.
33. Id. at 922; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) ("If. . . the
exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence ... its use... is unwarranted.").
34. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)). But
see James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 312 n. I (1990) (noting that in Leon several Justices emphasized
a broader purpose for the exclusionary rule).
35. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol59/iss2/7

4

Robinson: Constitutional Law: Supressing the Exclusionary Rule

2007]

CASE COMMENT

responding to the warrant.36 Further, the Court rejected the notion that
exclusion should be used to discipline judges and magistrates who
erroneously approve search warrants.3 The Court found no basis to believe
that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant would have a
significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge's or magistrate's future
actions.38
Eleven years later, the Court once again narrowed the exclusionary
rule's scope and application. In Arizona v. Evans,39 the Court encountered
the intersection of advancing computer technology, Fourth Amendment
violations, and the narrowing scope of the exclusionary rule. In Evans, the
Court considered whether suppression is compulsory when police conduct
a good faith search based on an electronic record subsequently deemed
erroneous.4" When police stopped respondent for a traffic violation, a
computer check revealed an outstanding arrest warrant."a Police arrested
respondent, and the search incident to his arrest revealed drugs.42 The State
charged the respondent with drug possession but later learned that
respondent's warrant had been quashed prior to his arrest.4 3 The
respondent moved to suppress the drug evidence as "fruit of an unlawful
arrest," and the trial court granted his motion." The Arizona Court of
Appeals reversed,45 observing that the exclusionary rule was not designed
to deter court or sheriff's office employees who are not directly connected
to the arresting officers.46 On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated
the appellate court's decision,47 and rejected the distinction between
clerical errors made by court employees and those made by law
enforcement.4 "
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari49 and created a
categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for "clerical errors of court

36. Id. at 926.
37. Id. at 916. The Court found no support to suggest that exclusion would deter judges and
magistrates from ignoring or subverting the Fourth Amendment. Id.
38. See id.at 907 n.6. Leon reaffirmed that the exclusionary rule operates as a judicially
crafted remedy to protect against future constitutional violations through its general deterrent effect.
Id. at 906. The Court underscored the rule's general deterrent purpose as directed toward police
misconduct, rather than serving as a tool to preserve judicial integrity. Id. at 921 n.22.
39. 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
40. Id. at 3-4.
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024, 1024 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
46. Id.at 1027.
47. State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 870 (Ariz. 1994).
48. Evans, 866 P.2d at 871.
49. Arizona v. Evans, 511 U.S. 1126, 1126 (1994).
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employees."5 The Court applied the Leon cost-benefit analysis and
reasoned that an inaccurate electronic record was not the type of
misconduct that the rule was designed to deter.5 The Court strongly
rejected any notion that judicial employees are inclined to subvert or
ignore the Fourth Amendment, or that lawlessness among those employees
required sanction through exclusion.52 The Court reasoned that because
court employees have no direct participation in the "competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime," they have no incentive in the outcome of
individual prosecutions.53 The Court thus decided that applying the
exclusionary rule could not and should not be expected to deter court
employees from making mistakes when performing their clerical duties.'
In affirming Petitioner's conviction, the instant Court applied the costbenefit analysis of Leon but largely avoided the stakeholder deterrence
analysis employed in Evans.55 Instead, the instant Court relied primarily
on the substantial social cost factor of the Leon cost-benefit analysis to
hold a knock-and-announce violation insufficient to trigger exclusion.56
Tracing the exclusionary rule's broad application back to its expansion in
Mapp, the instant Court observed a more recent shift away from
"'reflexive application."' 57 The instant Court further asserted that
exclusion was never automatic and required a causal connection not too
remote from the interests violated.5"
The Court then applied the Leon cost-benefit analysis. Evaluating the
rule and its concomitant social costs, the instant Court first stressed the
grave risk of releasing dangerous criminals when excluding incriminating

50. Evans, 514 U.S. at 16.
51. Id.at 14. As in Leon, the Court emphasized that "the exclusionary rule was... designed
as a means of deterring police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees." Id.; see United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984).
52. Evans,514 U.S. at 14-15; see Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.
53. Evans,514 U.S. at 15; cf Leon,468 U.S. at 917 (observingthat "[j]udges and magistrates
are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team [and] have no stake in the outcome of particular
criminal prosecutions").
54. Evans, 514 U.S. at 14-15.
55. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159,2165-66 (2006).
56. See id.(recognizing the adverse consequences of releasing dangerous criminals into
society).
57. Id.at 2163-64 (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 13 (1995)).
58. Id.at 2163-65. The instant Court observed that the violation of Petitioner's interests had
"nothing to do" with the seized evidence. Id.at 2165. Thus, because the relationship between the
knock-and-announce violation and Petitioner's proposed remedy was too attenuated, the instant
Court held exclusion inapplicable. Id.at 2164-65; see also id.
at 2170-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(arguing that suppression is inappropriate when the causal link between a knock-and-announce
violation and a subsequent search is too attenuated); cf Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984)
(adopting the doctrine of inevitable discovery as an exception to the exclusionary rule).
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evidence.59 Additionally, the instant Court expressed concern for an
administrative flood, fearing that every no-knock entry might trigger an
exclusionary claim.6" Finally, the instant Court reasoned that the
consequences of exclusion would weigh so heavily upon police that it
would induce excessively delayed entries.6 Such delays, the instant Court
concluded, would result in preventable violence against the police and
would encourage the destruction of evidence.62
Finding considerable social costs, the instant Court reasoned that the
social value of deterring knock-and-announce violations "depends upon
the strength of the incentive to commit [such violations].'63 While
observing that warrantless searches occasionally reveal incriminating
evidence, and thus increase the incentive to search without a warrant, the
instant Court distinguished knock-and-announce violations, concluding
that such violations do nothing more than prevent the destruction of
evidence and avoid "life-threatening resistance." The instant Court
therefore found the exclusionary rule's deterrence value nominal in knockand-announce situations and shifted its inquiry. Noting the evolution of
post-Mapp alternative remedies, the instant Court strongly emphasized the
viability of civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 198365 and increasing police
professionalism and internal discipline.66
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg, criticized the majority for removing the "strongest legal
incentive" to comply with the knock-and-announce rule and displacing
well-established principles of deterrence.67 Observing several exceptions
to exclusion for Fourth Amendment violations, Justice Breyer concluded

59. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165. But see James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311 (1990) ("The
occasional suppression of illegally obtained yet probative evidence has long been considered a
necessary cost of preserving overriding constitutional values .... ").
60. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-66. The instant Court expressed concern for increased
suppression hearings, analogizing an extension of the exclusionary rule to creating a lottery, where
many defendants might win the "jackpot" and receive a "get-out-of-jail-free card." Id. at 2166.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See supra note 12 (providing the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)).
66. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167-68. Concurring in the final judgment, Justice Kennedy observed
that the criminal justice system's training and internal disciplinary procedures supplement § 1983. Id.
at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The concurring opinion concluded that alternatives to the
exclusionary rule are more appropriate because the government "fortifie[s]" its procedures with more
specific regulations and legislation when ineffective. Id. However, Justice Kennedy noted that a broad
pattern of knock-and-announce violations would require further attention. Id. at 2171.
67. Id. at 2173-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer argued that in light of foundational
Fourth Amendment protections, the Court's knock-and-announce decisions required application
of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 2173.
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that the Court should not refuse to apply the rule when its application will
result in "'appreciable deterrence."' 68
The instant Court's holding retains the knock-and-announce
requirement, but it departs fundamentally from its precedent method of
enforcement. By exchanging the exclusionary rule for federal tort liability,
the instant Court signals a preference for special deterrence and a
corresponding withdrawal from the rule's general deterrence rationale.6 9
Thus, the instant Court inserts a newer remedy, which seeks to redress the
rights of one defendant, for a remedy designed to protect the interests of
all. A broader, more reflective analysis would have demanded a conclusion
different from that reached by the instant Court.
Although appearing technically consistent with the cost-benefit
analysis applied in Leon and Evans, the instant Court's decision deviates
from the rationale used to craft previous exceptions to the exclusionary
rule. Leon and Evans held that even when suppression might effectively
deter some police misconduct, the exclusionary rule cannot be expected
and should not be applied to deter "objectively reasonable law
enforcement activity."70 Yet, the instant Court "[h]appily" side-steps the
reasonableness inquiry.7' This preliminary conclusion largely removes the
constitutional violation as an influence within the Leon cost-benefit
analysis,72 which empowers the instant Court to collapse the deterrence
inquiry into a cursory inspection.
Prior to the instant decision, the Court seemed to be developing a
suppression exception rule that emphasized deterrence in light of relevant
stakeholder interests. In Leon, the Court observed that when police action
is taken "'in complete good faith..., the deterrence rationale loses much
of its force."' 73 Yet, the instant Court forecloses the good faith exception
and therefore departs from an established line of exclusionary exceptions.74
68. Id. at 2175 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)). Justice Breyer
noted that the Court also declined to apply the exclusionary rule when its inquiry concerned the
admission of evidence in non-criminal trials. Id.
69. See id. at 2167 (majority opinion).
70. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-19 (1984); accordArizona v. Evans, 514 U.S.
1, 15 (1995).
71. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163 (stating that Respondent conceded the constitutional knockand-announce violation and made no claim that the instant knock-and-announce comported with
constitutional police behavior).
72. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-20 (examining whether the exclusionary rule could be expected
to alter police behavior).
73. Id. at 919 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,447 (1974)); see also Evans, 514
U.S. at 13-14.
74. The dissent identified several good faith exclusionary exceptions. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at
2175 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Evans, 514 U.S. at 14-15 (providing an exception to the
exclusionary rule for clerical errors by court employees); Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20 (declining to
apply the exclusionary rule when the searching officer, in good faith, executes a defective search
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Consequently, the instant Court's analysis of the rule's deterrent benefits
appears unnecessary and arguably constitutes only an afterthought.
Nevertheless, the Court concludes that deterrence of knock-and-announce
violations is "not worth a lot" because no realistic incentive exists to
commit the forbidden act.75
Yet, the instant Court underestimates the deterrent benefits of applying
the exclusionary rule. While the instant Court recognizes general
deterrence as the bedrock and principal benefit of suppression, the Court
arguably ignores the stakeholder deterrence inquiry of Evans. Thus, the
instant Court fails to fully consider whether admitting Petitioner's
evidence will encourage future violations of Fourth Amendment rights.76
By substituting § 1983 damages for the exclusionary rule, the instant
Court missed an opportunity to achieve the optimal level of deterrence
while at the same time increasing police professionalism and internal
discipline." Although not explicit, the instant Court approaches the
exclusionary rule's application as if it barred individuals from further
recovery under § 1983. 7' These two remedies, however, are not mutually
exclusive. Thus, the instant Court fails to observe that knock-andannounce violations are not just private wrongs. Knock-and-announce
violations are serious public wrongs that affect many besides the chance
suspect. 79 An appropriate remedy for the public wrong demands the
official, systemic disapproval that only the state can express. Victims, on
warrant); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,454 (1976) (declining to apply the exclusionary rule
when doing so would "not result in appreciable deterrence").
75. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166.
76. See Janis, 428 U.S. at 453-54 (noting that whether the admission of the evidence
encourages Fourth Amendment violations is essentially the same inquiry as whether exclusion
would serve a deterrent purpose).
77. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167-68 ("[Because] lower [federal] courts are allowing
colorable knock-and-announce suits to go forward, unimpeded by assertions of qualified
immunity.... civil liability is an effective deterrent here .... (citations omitted)). The majority
finds that § 1983 has a unique role in influencing internal police discipline and professionalism. Id.
But see Evans, 514 U.S. at 18-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the exclusionary rule
"imposes costs on [the government], motivating it to train all of its personnel to avoid future
violations"). It is difficult, however, to measure the deterrent impact of any of these remedies. See,
e.g., Janis,428 U.S. at 450 n.22 (observing the lack of data and difficulty in measuring whether the
exclusionary rule reduces lawless searches and seizures).
78. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167.
79. A recent botched raid and fatal shooting of an eighty-eight-year-old woman in Atlanta,
Georgia illustrates the potentially devastating impact of unnecessary violence accompanying both
the execution of no-knock warrants and knock-and-announce violations. See Saeed Ahmed &
Adrianne M. Murchison, Woman 'sShooting Sparks AngryProtest:One of City's Worst Tragedies,
FranklinSays, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 29,2006, at 14A. At least one commentator suggests that
the increasing use of paramilitary style forced-entry raids makes such avoidable violence "neither
uncommon nor unpredictable." Radley Balko, Editorial, BotchedRaidsNot Rare: Little Oversight,
Bad Information a Deadly Mix, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 4, 2006, at 13A.
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the other hand, require an additional response."
While exclusion may amount to a "get-out-of-jail-free card" for many
blameworthy defendants, 8 ' the rule does nothing to restore the blameless
victim. Because the ruptured privacy of Petitioner's home cannot be
restored by exclusion, the instant Court reasons that a § 1983 damages
claim provides a superior remedy.82 The instant Court therefore sees
§ 1983 as a win-win result, in which the criminal is put behind bars, and
the officer is punished for the knock-and-announce violation. The problem
is that the substituted remedy has practical limitations.8 3
The instant Court's reasoning operates on an implicit assumption that
victims of constitutional violations will know the rules and adjust their
behavior accordingly. Thus, the Court assumes that victims are either wellinformed or will receive information that motivates them to pursue
damages under § 1983.' Yet, this introduces a further dilemma. In
substituting § 1983 for the exclusionary rule, the instant Court could
encourage perverse incentives. Arguably, the threat of damages will
encourage police to minimize personal liability, not misconduct. Thus,
exposure under § 1983 may bring the adverse effects of encouraging
police to conceal information about violations, commit perjury, resist
legitimate claims, or use public power to wagea war of attrition against
claimants.85

80. The Leon Court explicitly rejected the notion that exclusion vindicates a personal
constitutional right ofthe aggrieved. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,906 (1984) (citing United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
81. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166.
82. See id. at 2167-68. The majority provides no support to suggest that a § 1983 plaintiff
might collect more than nominal damages for a knock-and-announce violation. Id.at 2174 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("Even Michigan concedes that, 'in cases like the present one ...
,damages may be
virtually non-existent."' (citation omitted)).
83. See id at 2175. A § 1983 damages claim may be expensive to initiate and maintain, id
at 2174-75, regardless of applicable fee-shifting provisions. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 2007);
see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Few responsible lawyers and plaintiffs are likely to choose the
course of litigation if the statistical chances of success are truly de minimis."). Even assuming
plaintiffs can overcome the qualified immunity defense, § 1983 claims may require more time than
victims are willing to indulge. Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2174-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
84. Id, at 2167-68 (majority opinion). The instant Court premises this conjecture on a
contextual leap from formal assumptions to the substantive realities of constitutional violations.
Yet, in reality, police, rather than victims, are considerably more likely to change their behavior
in response to the instant decision; cf.Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652-53 (1961) (observing the
problem of permitting state use of evidence unconstitutionally seized by federal agents following
the Court's decision in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
85. Similarly, perverse incentives may already taint related judicial proceedings long before
a search warrant issues. See, e.g., Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater
Factor:An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago CriminalCourts, 63 U. COLO.L. REv. 75, 81-83
(1992) (detailing a perception among Chicago judges, public defenders, and prosecutors that
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CASE COMMENT

The instant case presented the Court with an opportunity to fortify
constitutional protections by acknowledging both a means to redress
personal rights and an existing prophylactic remedy designed to protect the
public at large. Yet by further restricting suppression, the instant Court
signals its growing disdain for the exclusionary rule and a willingness to
reexamine its use across a broad spectrum of constitutional violations. It
is difficult to forecast whether the instant decision will allow police to
exploit the benefits of increasingly efficient law enforcement without the
corresponding burden of constitutional responsibilities.86 But for now, the
instant Court's withdrawal from general deterrence principles, and its
substituted preference for alternative remedies, portends an uncertain
future for the exclusionary rule.

"pervasive police perjury" exists to obtain search warrants and "avoid the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment").
86. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("With the
benefits of more efficient law enforcement mechanisms comes the burden of corresponding
constitutional responsibilities.").

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 7

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol59/iss2/7

12

